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CORPORATE DISSOLUTION AND THE ANTI-TRUST LAWS
I
A corporation fears prosecution under the criminal provisions of the antitrust laws.1 As a defense measure it dissolves under state law to prevent the institution of such proceedings. Alternatively, the corporation may dissolve after
a prosecution has commenced and then move to abate the action.
In either case, it has been held that the corporation is immune from criminal
responsibility. In fact, until a recent decision banded down by the Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, 2 the cases were uniform in holding the corporation absolved of liability,3 since dissolution was held indistinguishable from the
death of an individual.
Dissolution, however, does not defeat a civil action brought by the government for an injunction. Equity proceedings may be brought subsequent to dissolution, and pending proceedings do not abate. 4 Thus the corporation is found
in the interesting position of being "alive" for the purposes of civil suits, yet
legally "dead" for the purposes of the criminal prosecution.
The rule concerning abatement and survival of criminal actions is not based
on a vagary of the anti-trust laws, but apparently applies to all criminal proceedings. The Supreme Court, however, has never held explicitly that a corporation may escape criminal liability by dissolution. A further possible limitation
may be found in the fact that apparently no cases involving bad faith dissolutions have reached the courts. Were the courts faced with a dissolution undertaken for the sole purpose of escaping criminal liability, it is not unreasonable to
assume that they would search carefully for a way to maintain control over the
defendant. But the motives of the defendants have not appeared important in
'26 Stat. 209 (1890), 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1-3 (1951) (Sherman Anti-trust Act).
States v. Collier & Son, 208 F. 2d 936 (C.A. 7th, 1953).
3 Attempted prosecution after dissolution: United States v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 140 F. 2d
834 (C.A. 10th, 1944); United States v. Borden Co., 28 F. Supp. 177 (N.D. Ill., 1939). See,
for an excellent general discussion, Marcus, Suability of Dissolved Corporations, 58 Harv. L.
Rev. 675 (1945). Abatement: United States v. Line Material Co., 202 F. 2d 929 (C.A. 6th,
1953); United States v. Leche, 44 F. Supp. 765 (E.D. La., 1942) .(Connally Hot Oil Act).
Consult: State v. Arkansas Cotton Oil Co., 116 Ark. 74,171 S.W. 1192 (1914) (Arkansas Antitrust Act); Mason v. Adoue, 30 Tex. Civ. App. 276, 70 S.W. 347 (1902) (Texas Anti-Trust Act).
4 Such actions fall within state statutes discussed.at pages 482-85 infra. United States v.
Bates Valve Bag Corp., 39 F. 2d 162 (D.C. Del., 1930); United States v. American Optical
Co., 97 F. Supp. 71 (N.D. Ill., 1951). Cf., e.g., United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n,
166 U.S. 290, 307-10 (1897) (unincorporated organization). The successors to the dissolved
corporation may be brought into court as parties in interest under the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, Rule 25(c). United States v. American Optical Co., 97 F. Supp. 71 (N.D. III.,
1951). It is probable that successors are bound by an order affecting by its terms the dissolved corporation only. Cf. Rule 65(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure; Le Tourneau
Co. v. N.L.R.B., 150 F. 2d 1012 (C.A. 5th, 1945), rev'd on other grounds, 324 U.S. 793 (1945)
(injunction binding the corporation held to bind agents and successors in privity with the
corporation who receive actual notice of the order).
2 United
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the reported cases. In UnitedStates v. Lechle and United States v. Line Materials
Co.8 the dissolutions were in "good faith," i.e., not for the express purpose of
avoiding the impending prosecution. In the remaining cases, the motives for
7
dissolution were not mentioned.
In a recent case, however, a proposed corporate dissolution was enjoined because a criminal action was pending against the corporation. In United States v.
Western PennsylvaniaSand and Gravel Association,8 the government prosecuted
a dozen sand and gravel producers for criminal and civil contempt of a 1940
consent decree. While the contempt proceeding was pending, one corporate defendant moved to abate the prosecution against it on the grounds that it
planned to dissolve. The court granted the government's motion to restrain the
completion of the dissolution in order to insure continued criminal responsibility. This appears to be the first modern instance in which a federal court has
issued such a restraining order.9 Perhaps the infrequency of such orders may be
explained by the fact that the court seldom knows of the proposed dissolution
in advance, and it loses its jurisdiction upon completed dissolution.
The Western Pennsylvania Sand and Gravel case refuses to apply the rules
concerning a completed dissolution to one that is impending. While this limitation is desirable as a matter of policy, it does not affect the major area of the law.
II
The present state of the law has resulted from a failure of the courts to treat
corporate dissolutions realistically when the corporation is involved in criminal
proceedings. The common law rules concerning abatement and survival of actions have been narrowed or obliterated in all areas other than the area of criminal prosecutions of corporations. 10 This lag may perhaps be attributed to the
relative infrequency of such actions.
At common law all criminal actions abated upon the death of an individual
defendant."' The same rule applied to civil actions except in a few specific situations. 2 Similarly, actions against a corporation abated upon its dissolution,
s 44 F. Supp. 765 (E.D. La., 1942).
6202 F. 2d 929 (C.A. 6th, 1953).
7 In United States v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 140 F. 2d 834 (C.A. 10th, 1944), the last of five
dissolutions occurred barely three days before the indictments were served, yet the court
dismissed the suits without commenting upon this suspicious circumstance.
8 114 F. Supp. 158 (W.D. Pa., 1953).
9Suits to restrain corporate dissolution have seldom been in the federal courts, particularly
since dissolution has little effect on bankruptcy proceedings. See note 53 infra. But cf. Fisk
v. Union Pac. R. Co., 9 Fed. Cas. 166, No. 4830 (C.C. S.D. N.Y., 1873) (dissolution restrained
to prevent fraud on creditors).
10 The development has been almost completely statutory. 1 C.J.S. Abatement and Re-

vival §116 et seq. (1936).
11United States v. Pomeroy, 152 Fed. 279 (C.C. S.D. N.Y., 1907), rev'd on other grounds,
164 Fed. 324 (C.A. 2d, 1908).,
"1 C.J.S. Abatement and Revival § 115 (1936).
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which the courts refused to distinguish from the death of an individual. The rule
applied to corporations was understandable, since corporate assets escheated to
the Crown upon formal dissolution."
The common law rules of abatement of civil actions have been drastically
limited by statutory enactment, both in England and in the United States.
Survival statutes have been enacted in most common law jurisdictions. 15 However, the statutes widening survival of civil actions have not been applied to
.corporations, to which the common law rules continue to apply.16 Thus, while
the common law rules of corporate dissolution have been rationalized by a comparison to the death of an individual, dissolution has not been held to be so similar that the new statutory rules of survivability of actions could be applied to it.
With the emergence of the modern business corporation it became evident
that the law led to harsh results. The whole concept of the corporation had
changed. Modem procedures of corporate organization bear little resemblance
to the special grant of power from the Crown required in earlier days. 17 Dissolution now can be achieved without a formal court decree." The return of the
charter to the incorporating state authority is normally a routine procedure and
receives little public attention. 9 But because easy methods of incorporation and
dissolution were too readily abused to avoid payment of just claims, all states
have adopted remedial legislation or devised other means of affording some protection to creditors. By far the most common devices are statutory enactments 2
which provide that either ",suits,"' 2 "actions," 22 or "proceedings"'"

may be

9 Holdsworth, History of English Law 69-71 (1926). Probably this statement arose since
the same rule applied in both the individual and corporate person situation. Certainly the
two were not treated as identical for all purposes. Ibid., at 49 and 69.
13

14

Ibid., at 69-71.

" 1 C.J.S. Abatement and Revival § 116 (1936). See Note, Inadequacies of English and
State Survival Legislation, 48 Harv. L. Rev. 1008 (1935).
16Torry v. Robertson, 24 Miss. 192 (1852).
179 Holdsworth, History of English Law 45-48 (1926).
IS Ballantine, Corporations § 316 (1946); 16 Fletcher, Cyclopedia of Corporations 8025
(Perm. Ed., 1942).
19Consider, for example, the situation in In re Peer Manor Bldg. Corp., 134 F. 2d 839
(C.A. 7th, 1943), cert. denied 320 U.S. 211 (1942). Creditors started involuntary bankruptcy
proceedings against a corporation, only to discover it had forfeited its charter to the state
seven years earlier. See also 16 Fletcher, Cyclopedia of Corporations 8013 (Perm. Ed., 1942).
Notice by publication is required by several states. Ballantine, Corporations § 316 (1946).
20Idaho, Iowa, Kentucky, Louisiana, and Washington do not have such statutes. These
states achieve the same result by other means. See, for example, Ky. Rev. Stat. (Baldwin,
Supp., 1953) § 271.515 et seq.; 5 La. Rev. Stat. (West, 1951) § 12:57(1), and commentary,
Dunbar and Nabors, The Louisiana Business Corporation Law, Ibid., at pp. XXXI, LXIV;
2 Wash. Rev. Code (1951) § 23.44.050.
21Ala. Code Ann., Tit. 10 § 110 (West, 1941); 1 Alaska Comp. Laws (1949) § 36-1-148; 4
Ariz. Code Ann. (Supp., 1951) 853-309; 6 Ark. Stat. Ann. (1948) § 64-806; 2 Fla. Stat. (1951)
§§ 611.32, 612.47, 612.53; Ga. Code Ann. (Harrison, Supp., 1951) § 22-1874; Kan. Gen.
Stat. Ann. (Corrick, 1949) § 17-3606; 1 Me. Rev. Stat. (1944) c. 49, § 99; 1 Md. Ann.
Code (Flack, 1951) Art. 23, §§ 74(b), 78 (sue or be sued); 5 Mass. Ann. Laws (Michie, 1948)
c. 155, § 51; 15 Mich. Stat. Ann. (Henderson, 1937) § 21.75; 4 Miss. Code Ann. (1942) § 5353
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brought by or against the corporation for a specified time 4 after dissolution. 21
The federal courts have ruled that these state statutes determine the suability
of dissolved corporations for federal purposes. 6 Since there are no state authorities passing on the applicability of these statutes to criminal actions, the federal
courts were faced with a problem of first impression.
In the leading case of United States v. Safeway Stores,27 indictments charging
violations of the criminal provisions of the Sherman Act were returned shortly
after the dissolution of five subsidiary co-defendants. The subsidiaries had
been incorporated in California, Nevada, Delaware, and Texas. The court held
that the California statute, 8 which provides that "actions" may be brought
subsequent to dissolution, did not permit institution of a criminal proceeding
since
[a] criminal prosecution, although instituted by an individual, is not in any sense an
action between the person instituting it and the prisoner. It is not an action at all.
That is defined to be "the legal demand of one's rights, or the form given by law for
the recovery of that which is due." Bouvier's Law Dictionary. 21
The court read the Nevada"0 and Delaware3 statutes as providing that "suits"
(of suing and being sued); 2 Mont. Rev. Code (1947) § 15-1102(16) (sue or be sued); I Neb.

Rev. Stat. (1943) §21-186; 2 N.H. Rev. Laws (1942) c. 274, §97; 1 N.J. Rev. Stat. (1937)
§ 14:13-4; 4 N.M. Stat. Ann. (1941) § 54-503; N.Y. Gen. Corp. Law (22 McKinney, 1951)
§ 29; N.Y. Stock Corp. Law (58 McKinney, 1951) § 105(8); 2 Ohio Rev. Code Ann. (Baldwin,
1953) Tit. 17, § 1701.87 (sue and be sued); R.I. Gen. Laws (1938) c. 116, §58; 1 S.C. Code
(1952) § 12-601; Tenn. Code (Michie, 1938) § 3757; 2 Utah Code Ann. (1953) § 16-1-2; Vt.
Stat. (1947) § 5841; Va. Code Ann. (1950) § 1370; W.Va. Code Ann. (1949) § 3095.
21 Corp. C.A. (Calif., Deering, 1933) § 5400; 2 Minn. Stat. (1949) c. 300.59; 2B Gen. Stat.
N.C. (Michie, 1950) § 55-132; 15 Pa. Stat. (Purdon, 1938) § 2852-1106; 1 S.D. Code (1939)
§ 11.0903; 3 Wyo. Comp. Stat. (1945) § 44-1103 (suit or action).
215 Ore. Comp. Laws Ann. (Supp., 1947) § 77-259 (action, suit, or proceeding); Wis. Stat.
(1951) § 180.787 (suit or proceeding). A few states provide, that a dissolution will not take
away or impair any "remedy" against the corporation: 2 Colo. Stat. Ann. (Michie, 1935) c. 41,
§ 68; Ill. Ann. Stat. (Smith-Hurd, 1935) c. 32, § 157.94; 6 Ind.. Ann. Stats. (Burns, 1948)
§ 25-241(2); 17 Mo. Ann. Stat. (Vernon, 1949) § 351.565.
24 Most states provide a period of two to five years. A few have no stated time period, which
means actions will be barred only by the statute of limitations. See Ballantine, Corporations
§ 316 (1946), who argues that the latter form of statute is more desirable.
25There are similar provisions to the effect that pending actions will not abate on dissolution. These statutes employ similar words, but are sometimes broader.
26 Defence Supplies Corp. v. Lawrence Co., 336 U.S. 631, 634 (1949); Chicago Title & Trust
Co. v. Wilcox Bldg. Corp., 302 U.S. 120, 125 (1937); Oklahoma Gas Co. v. Oklahoma, 273
U.S. 257, 259 (1927). For discussion of this rule, see page 487 infra.
27140 F. 2d 834 (C.A. 10th, 1944).
28

Corp. C.A. (Calif., Deering, 1953) §5400.

" United States v. Safeway Stores, 140 F. 2d 834, 839 (C.A. 10th, 1944). However, the

court weakens its case somewhat by using the term "criminal action" earlier in its opinion.
Ibid., at 836.

30 1 Nev. Comp. Laws (Hillyer, 1929) § 1664, amended, Nev. Comp. Laws (Supp., 1949).

11Del. Corp. Law Ann. (1947) § 42. The statute more recently has been construed differ-

ently. See United States v. Collier & Son, 208 F. 2d 936 (C.A. 7th, 1953).
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may be brought subsequent to dissolution. It was held that these statutes
did not permit the institution of criminal prosecutions either:
But irrespective of lexicographers and precise technical definition, the expression
"criminal suit" is unnatural and awkward to the professional ear, and is seldom used,
even in common parlance. "Suit" in its general, unqualified use in legal documents,
such as the one before us, naturally means, and should be construed as intended to indude, the mode or manner authorized and adopted by law to redress civil injuries.Y
Finally the Texas statute, which provides that "judicial proceedings" may be
brought subsequent to dissolution, likewise was held not to permit criminal proceedings. The court admitted that the term "judicial proceeding" may be more
broadly construed than the terms "actions" or "suits." But it relied on another
section of the statute which provides that no criminal action by the state of
Texas shall be lost by dissolution, and from this drew the negative inference that
prosecutions by other sovereigns are excluded. 33
In United States v. Line MaterialsCo.,34 the defendant had dissolved in good
faith after the institution of criminal proceedings under the Sherman Act. Hence
the case concerned the abatement of a pending action rather than the possibility
of instituting future prosecutions. The applicable Delaware statute provides
that:
All corporations... shall nevertheless be continued for the term of three years... for
the purpose of prosecuting and defending suits by or against them... ; provided, however, that with respect to any action, suit or proceeding begun or commenced by or
against the corporation prior to such expiration or dissolution ... and with respect
to any action, suit or proceeding begun or commenced by or against the corporation
within three years after the date of such expiration or dissolution... such corporation
shall for the purposes of such actions suits or proceedings so begun or commenced be
period and until any judgments, orders,
continued bodies corporate beyond said...
3
or decrees therein shall be fully executed.
The court, nevertheless, held that the action abated upon dissolution, since
"The dominating term of the section is the word 'suits' which stands, alone in
the enabling language of the section ..... a
37
In the recent case of United States v. Collier & Son, the Seventh Circuit refused to follow the preceding cases. A criminal proceeding was brought under
the Fair Labor Standards Act3" eight months after the defendant had dissolved
under Delaware law. The court construed the Delaware statute to permit the
institution of such a proceeding, and refused to follow the Line Materials case:
2United States v. Safeway Stores, 140 F. 2d 834, 838 (C.A. 10th, 1944).

SIbid., at 839. 3 Tex. Stat. Ann. (Vernon, 1945) §§ 1388, 1374.
4 202 F. 2d 929 (C.A. 6th, 1953).

U Del. Corp. Law Ann. (1947) § 42.

"1United States v. Line Material Co., 202 F. 2d 929, 931 (C.A. 6th, 1953).
37 208 F. 2d 936 (C.A. 7th, 1953).
3852 Stat, 1060 (1938), 28 U.S.C.A. § 201 (1947).
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We agree that the word "suit" or the word "action" standing alone might reasonably
be held as not including a criminal prosecution, but when the word "proceeding" is
a combination is presented which is well near conclusive of all forms
added we think
39
of litigation.
This interpretation of the Delaware statute appears to rest on firm grounds.
However the effect of the case is limited. Only a handful of the states provides
that "proceedings" may be brought subsequent to dissolution. In the majority
of the states, the Safeway result still holds.
III
It is difficult to reconcile the Safeway and Line Materialscases with policy
considerations. There appears to be little basis on which one can argue that the
drafters of the corporate survival statutes intended to differentiate between
criminal and civil actions. The intent of the drafters seems clear. Corporations
should not be able to escape liability by the voluntary act of dissolution. Criminal actions against corporations are relatively rare, and it is reasonable to suppose that the drafters did not consider them, much less realize that they were
not, in terms, included within the statute. The Safeway case fails to go beyond
0
the express wording of the statutes and restricts their apparent intent. The
Line Materials case goes even further, and expressly refuses to apply a proviso
of the statute. There is no consideration of the policy underlying either the
criminal or the survival statute; rather, the courts constrict the meanings of
words in an effort to follow an ancient common law rule of dubious origin and
doubtful merit.
The basic idea underlying the two decisions is a supposed similarity between
corporate dissolution and the death of an individual. Criminal actions should
abate upon the demise of the individual; imprisonment is rather ineffective, and
4
the levying of a fine in effect punishes the defendant's heirs. 1 It is apparent,
however, that these reasons against continued criminal liability do not apply to
a corporate defendant.
In other fields of the law the fictional character of the corporation as a legal
person has long been realized.Y The corporation is a legal entity separating cer39208 F. 2d 936, 939 (C.A. 7th, 1953).
1It has often been stated that these statutes are remedial and to be liberally construed.
E.g., Eastman, Gardiner & Co. v. Warren, 109 F. 2d 193 (C.A. 5th, 1940).
41 United States v. Pomeroy, 152 Fed. 279 (C.C. S.D. N.Y., 1907), rev'd on other grounds,
164 Fed. 324 (C.A. 2d, 1908); Singer v. United States, 323 U.S. 338, 346 (1945); United States
v. Mook, 125 F. 2d 706 (C.A. 2d, 1942); Rossi v. United States, 21 F. 2d 747 (C.A. 8th, 1927);
Pino v. United States, 278 Fed. 479 (C.A. 7th, 1921); Dyar v. United States, 186 Fed. 614
(C.A. 5th, 1911); United States v. Mitchell, 163 Fed. 1014 (C.C. Ore., 1908), aff'd United
States v. Dunne, 173 Fed. 254 (C.A. 9th, 1909).
42
For example a dissolved corporation may enter into voluntary bankruptcy proceedings.
Bache v. Louisiana Oil Ref. Corp., 97 F. 2d 445 (C.A. 5th, 1938). Dissolved corporations remain personally liable for taxes on income earned prior to dissolution. Carter v. Commissioner,
9 T.C. 364 (1947). A corporation may enter into a personal service contract after dissolution.
Applicgtion of Peters, 271 App. Div. 518, 67 N.Y.S. 2d 305 (3d Dep't, 1947).
4
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tain assets from a group of people who control them through the corporation;
it is organized to limit the entrepreneurial liability, and it conducts business in
its own name. Dissolution of a corporation does not ipso facto affect the assets,
the controlling group, or the controlling group's control of the assets. Since the
control may be exercised through other legal media, corporate dissolution may
have little or no significance. Thus, having once established that a corporation
may be criminally liable, it is difficult to see why criminal responsibility should
- terminate merely because the corporation has voluntarily dissolved. A fine
against a dissolved corporation may be just as effective as a fine against a corporation not dissolved.
After dissolution the controlling group may retain control over all or substantially all of the corporate assets and continue the business through the
medium of a different corporation, as a partnership, or individually. In this
situation liability for the corporation's crimes should be visited upon the successor organization. In the alternative situation of a sale of the corporate assets to
outsiders, criminal liability should ultimately rest on the stockholders of the
original corporation. Where, after dissolution, the assets or the proceeds therefrom are retained by a trustee, fines or penalties should be levied against the
assets before distribution to the shareholders. Where the proceeds have been
distributed, the shareholders should assume pro rata liability to the extent of
their distributed shares. A distinction is made between dispositions en bloc and
piece-meal dispositions in the decisions under the equitable provisions of the
anti-trust laws which, as civil actions, do not abate upon dissolution.43 If the
assets have been widely distributed so that future violations are improbable,
no injunction will be issued." There appears, however, to be no reason for following a similar distinction in criminal actions, since their primary function is
the punishment of past violations.
The results of all the cases have been reached by the application of the state
laws of survival of actions against corporations. "Thus the question, as to
whether a corporation is continued for the purpose of prosecuting or defending
civil suits or criminal actions, depends upon the law of the state of its incorporation."4 This result is predicated on the fact that a corporation is a creature
of the state and exists only by the operation of state law.16 If the state so decrees, the existence of the corporation is determined; hence it follows, so the
argument goes, that the state must have the sole voice in determining when its
3United States v. Bates Valve Bag Corp., 39 F. 2d 162 (D.C. Del., 1930); United States v.
American Optical Co., 97 F. Supp. 71 (N.D. Ill.,
1951).
44
Compare United States v. William S. Gray & Co., 59 F. Supp. 665 (S.D. N.Y., 1945),
with cases cited note 43 supra.
46United States v.'Safeway Stores, 140 F. 2d 834, 836 (C.A. 10th, 1944).
46The Supreme Court has been so clear on this point that it is improbable that any lower
court would refuse to apply the state law. See cases cited note 26 supra. However, these are all
civil cases.
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creature has died sufficiently to be no longer criminally or civilly responsible. 41
In fact, however, upon voluntary dissolution the state usually determines only
whether the corporation may still legally transact business as a corporation;48
often the business is continued as a partnership or other unincorporated business
venture, retaining the same name. 49 The question whether a corporation may

continue to transact business should not be determinative of its continued
criminal liability, and the policy for leaving this determination solely to the
state appears doubtful.
The cases have applied the state law without serious discussion, and all the
authorities cited involve civil rather than criminal actions. While Rule 17(b) of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 0 provides that in civil cases in the federal
courts the state law controls the suability of dissolved corporations, there is no
analogue to Rule 17(b) in the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.5 ' Further,
while the rule of Erie v. Tompkins 2 may establish a policy for the application
of state law in most civil cases, that rule, again, does not apply to criminal actions arising solely under federal statutes.
There are good reasons against the application of the state law of survival of
corporate actions in cases arising under federal statutory law. A state statute
which permits a corporation by dissolution to escape federal liability may
seriously limit the effect of federal statutes. The state should not be able to do
indirectly what it cannot do directly."
United States v. Lecile 4 is the only authority to the effect that the state law
does not apply in federal criminal proceedings. The case involved an indictment
under the Connelly Hot Oil Act which was returned before dissolution of the
47 The matter is usually not stated so starkly. In Oklahoma Gas Co. v. Oklahoma, 273 U.S.
257, 259 (1927) the Court reaches this conclusion: "But corporations exist for specific purposes
... so that if the life of the corporation is to continue even only for litigating purposes, it is
necessary that there should be some statutory authority for the prolongation."
48 16 Fletcher, Cyclopedia of Corporations 8132 (1942).
49
In United States v. Safeway Stores, 140 F. 2d 834 (C.A. 10th, 1944), for instance, the
same subsidiaries were owned after dissolution by the same parent corporation. The dissolution merely affected a simplification of the corporate structure in the Safeway hierarchy. The
identical pattern occurred in United States v. Borden Co., 28 F. Supp. 177 (N.D. Ill., 1939). In
Walling v. James Reuter, Inc.;321 U.S. 671 (1944), the corporation continued in business as
an unincorporated entity, using the same name.
50 28 U.S.C.A. Fed. Rules Civ. Proc. (1950).
5118 U.S.C.A. Fed. Rules Crim. Proc. (1951).
52304 U.S. 64 (1938).

53 In the field of bankruptcy, the federal courts have quite uniformly prevented dissolutions from affecting the paramount jurisdiction of the Federal Courts. The United States
Bankruptcy Laws are "paramount." International Shoes Co. v. Pinkus, 278 U.S. 261 (1929).
If the federal court has obtained jurisdiction, a subsequent dissolution by operation of state
law will be ignored. Bache v. Louisiana Oil Ref. Corp., 97 F. 2d 445 (C.A. 5th, 1938); In re
Adams & Hoyt Co., 164 Fed. 489 (N.D. Ga., 1908); In re Pacific Alloy & Steel Co., 299 Fed.
952 (C.A. 9th, 1924).
S4 44 F. Supp. 765 (E.D. La., 1942)..
5549 Stat. 30 (1935), 15 U.S.C.A. § 715 (1948).
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corporate defendant. The Louisiana District Court refused to apply the Texas
statute, and held the federal law controlling. Since it found no federal statutory
law on the subject, the court, holding that "there is no federal general common
law,"' applied the common law of 1790, and the action abated. 7
It has been suggested58 that a dissolution under statelaw should not bar prosecution of the corporation under the federal anti-trust laws. It is argued that
since the federal statute is explicitly made applicable to corporations and since
.it attempts to punish "every contract, combination... ," it constitutes an
express statutory enactment superseding the state law on corporate dissolution
and continuing the federal liability of the dissolved corporations. The courts,
however, have not accepted this argument.
Since it is doubtful whether the Safeway, Line Material,and Collier cases will
be overruled, the most feasible way of changing the present~law appears to be
by federal statute, expressly superseding state law and continuing federal liability after 'corporate dissolution. Such a statute should not meet with serious
constitutional objection. Despite occasional dicta' to the contrary,69 there should
be little trouble in upholding its constitutionality under the plenary federal
powers to regulate interstate commerce. To forestall possible arguments under
the Due Process Clause, the statute might be limited to situations where the
assets of the dissolved corporation remain substantially intact.
IV
It is difficult to determine the importance of the present loophole in the antitrust laws. To the corporation the practical expense and inconvenience of dissolution may be formidable, but if the sanctions are severe the corporation may
still prefer this alternative. Since a successful anti-trust action by the government may be presented as evidence in private suits, 0 which do not abate upon
dissolution, 6 the actual cost of a successful prosecution may be considerably
greater than the criminal penalties involved. Where, however, individuals as
well as the corporation are criminally charged, these individuals will remain
liable notwithstanding the dissolution, and the action will be continued against
them.
The effect of defeating an anti-trust prosecution becomes serious when the
heavy burden and expense of preparing such actions are considered..In addition,
effective relief to wronged parties may be impeded by the abatement of the
"Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938).
• See Marcus, Suability of Dissolved Corporations, 58 Harv. L. Rev. 675, 676-83 (1945),
for a criticism of the Leche case. The case has virtually no precedent value, having been
decided by a District Court fully two years before the Safeway case.
"Ibid., at 698 et seq.
"9See Missouri ex rel. Darr v. Collins, 34 F. Supp. 549 (W.D. Mo., 1940).
40 38 Stat. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C.A. § 15 (1951), and annotations.
6l Imperial Film Exchange v. General Film Co., 244 Fed. 985 (D.C. S.D. N.Y., 1915).
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criminal prosecution. In view of these practical considerations, the present rule
appears to encourage violations of the law. On the other hand, the civil action
is not affected by a dissolution, and in numerous cases this relief is sought without a concomitant criminal prosecution.
While there appear few reported cases in which a corporate defendant has
gained immunity by dissolution, there exists no record of actual incidents which
did not go beyond the trial court. At least one writer has indicated that it is not
an infrequent occurrence, but that few cases are appealed. 2
62Marcus, op. cit. supra note 57. See also, Note, 32 Col. L. Rev. 347, 360 (1932).

"CONSERVATION"--A NEW AREA FOR URBAN
REDEVELOPMENT
The most recent legal problem in the growing field of urban redevelopment
is presented by an amendment to the Illinois Neighborhood Redevelopment
Corporation Law' authorizing groups of citizens to incorporate2 in order to
exercise the power of eminent domain for a unique purpose: the "conservation"
of deteriorating urban areas. The effect of this new legislation is to arm with a
substantial weapon groups most interested in preventing further neighborhood

deterioration. Its premise is that such groups, by acquiring and rebuilding isolated dilapidated structures, may be best able to restore a declining neighborhood and prevent its becoming a slum.

The amendment makes available for neighborhood "conservation" the procedures which the original 1941 act set up for the redevelopment of areas already
deteriorated to the "slum" or "blight" stages. 3 There are three procedural steps
which must be carried out before actual reconstruction of the area may begin.
First, a group of at least three citizens, presumably including, in most cases,
residents of the neighborhood, must incorporate. This requires filing with the
Secretary of State certain organizational information and a statement of proposed redevelopment objectives. 4 Second, a "development plan" meeting specific statutory requirements 5 must be approved by the appropriate local RedeI The Neighborhood Redevelopment Corporation Law, Ill. Rev. Stat. (1941) c. 32, §§ 550.1550.44, approved July 9, 1941, amended July 13, 1953, Sen. Bill 627, 68th Assemb. Reg. Sess.
(1953).
2
Private redevelopment corporations were authorized by the 1941 Act, ibid., and similar
legislation of the earlier type is found today in a number of states, including Indiana, Kansas,
Kentucky, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, New Jersey, New
York, Virginia, and Wisconsin.
3Sen. Bill 627, op. cit. supra note 1, at § 3-9.
4Ill. Rev. Stat. (1941) c. 32, § 550.7.
5
Ibid., at § 550.17 (1). Such plan must contain a legal description of the proposed Development Area; present use of property therein; structures to be demolished, repaired, or altered;
new structures contemplated; contemplated recreation areas; zoning changes; method of fmancing the development; time estimates of developing the area and other pertinent information.

